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Princeton University Library Catalog
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Essays on paradoxes / Terence Horgan.
Author
Horgan, Terry, 1948-
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Uniform title
Works.
Selections.
2016
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Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017]
Description
vii, 322 pages ; 25 cm
Availability
Copies in the Library
Location
Call Number
Status
Location Service
Notes
Firestone Library - Stacks
BC199.P2 H67 2017
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Subject(s)
Paradox
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Logic
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Summary note
"This volume brings together many of Terence Horgan's essays on paradoxes: Newcomb's problem, the Monty Hall problem, the two-envelope paradox, the sorites paradox, and the Sleeping Beauty problem. Newcomb's problem arises because the ordinary concept of practical rationality constitutively includes normative standards that can sometimes come into direct conflict with one another. The Monty Hall problem reveals that sometimes the higher-order fact of one's having reliably received pertinent new first-order information constitutes stronger pertinent new information than does the new first-order information itself. The two-envelope paradox reveals that epistemic-probability contexts are weakly hyper-intensional; that therefore, non-zero epistemic probabilities sometimes accrue to epistemic possibilities that are not metaphysical possibilities; that therefore, the available acts in a given decision problem sometimes can simultaneously possess several different kinds of non-standard expected utility that rank the acts incompatibly. The sorites paradox reveals that a certain kind of logical incoherence is inherent to vagueness, and that therefore, ontological vagueness is impossible. The Sleeping Beauty problem reveals that some questions of probability are properly answered using a generalized variant of standard conditionalization that is applicable to essentially indexical self-locational possibilities, and deploys "preliminary" probabilities of such possibilities that are not prior probabilities."--Jacket flap.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents
Part One: Newcomb's problem
Counterfactuals and Newcomb's problem
Newcomb's problem: a stalemate
Newcomb's problem revisted
Part Two: The Monty Hall Problem
Let's make a deal
Part Three: The two-envelope paradox, nonstandard expected utility, and the intensionality of probability
The two-envelope paradox and the foundations of rational decision theory (abridged)
Part Four: The sorites paradox
Robust vagueness and the forced-march sorites paradox
Transvaluationism: a Dionysian approach to vagueness
Part Five: The sleeping beauty problem
Sleeping beauty awakened: new odds at the dawn of the new day
Synchronic Bayesian updating and the sleeping beauty problem: reply to Pust
The exchange continued: response to Pust's response to my reply
Generalized conditionalization and the sleeping beauty problem, II
Part Six: Epistemic probabilty
Epistemic probability.
Show 15 more Contents items
ISBN
9780199858422 ((hardcover ; : alk. paper))
019985842X ((hardcover ; : alk. paper))
LCCN
2016007610
OCLC
958962348
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