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The executive unbound : after the Madisonian republic / Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule.
Author
Posner, Eric A., 1965-
[Browse]
Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
New York : Oxford University Press, 2010.
Description
249 pages ; 25 cm
Availability
Available Online
Oxford Scholarship - Oxford University Press: Law
University Press Scholarship Online Law
Copies in the Library
Location
Call Number
Status
Location Service
Notes
Firestone Library - Stacks
KF5050 .P67 2010
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Stokes Library - Wallace Hall (SPIA)
KF5050 .P67 2010
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Details
Subject(s)
Executive power
—
United States
[Browse]
Related name
Vermeule, Adrian, 1968-
[Browse]
Summary note
"Ever since Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. used "imperial presidency" as a book title, the term has become central to the debate about the balance of power in the U.S. government. Since the presidency of George W. Bush, when advocates of executive power such as Dick Cheney gained ascendancy, the argument has blazed hotter than ever. Many argue the Constitution itself is in grave danger. What is to be done?
The answer, according to legal scholars Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, is nothing. In The Executive Unbound, they provide a bracing challenge to conventional wisdom, arguing that a strong presidency is inevitable in the modern world. Most scholars, they note, object to today's level of executive power because it varies so dramatically from the vision of the framers of the Constitution. But Posner and Vermeule closely examine James Madison's writings, and find fault with his premises. Like an ideal market, they write, Madison's separation of powers has no central director, but it lacks the price system which gives an economy its structure; there is nothing in checks and balances that intrinsically generates order or promotes positive arrangements. In fact, the greater complexity of the modern world produces a concentration of power, particularly in the White House.
The authors chart the rise of executive authority, noting that among strong presidents only Nixon has come in for severe criticism, leading to legislation which was designed to limit the presidency, yet which failed to do so. Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law. The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution."--Pub. desc.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents
The constitutional framework
Constitutional change
The statutory framework
Constraints on the executive
Global liberal legalism
Tyrannophobia.
Show 3 more Contents items
ISBN
9780199765331 ((hardcover ; : acid-free paper))
0199765332 ((hardcover ; : acid-free paper))
9780199934034 ((paperback))
0199934037 ((paperback))
9780199830466 ((e-book))
0199830460 ((e-book))
LCCN
2010023201
OCLC
640132509
Statement on language in description
Princeton University Library aims to describe library materials in a manner that is respectful to the individuals and communities who create, use, and are represented in the collections we manage.
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The executive unbound : after the Madisonian republic / Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule.
id
99125539062106421
The executive unbound : after the Madisonian republic / Eric A. Posner, Adrian Vermeule.
id
SCSB-10438947