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Game theory : an introduction / Steven Tadelis.
Author
Tadelis, Steve
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Format
Book
Language
English
Published/Created
Princeton ; Oxford : Princeton University Press, ©2013.
Description
xvii, 396 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm
Availability
Copies in the Library
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Status
Location Service
Notes
Lewis Library - Stacks
HB144 .T33 2013
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Details
Subject(s)
Game theory
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Summary note
This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. -- from back cover.
Bibliographic references
Includes bibliographical references (p. 385-388) and index.
Contents
Part I: Rational decision making. The single-person decision problem
Introducing uncertainty and time
Part II: Static games of complete information. Preliminaries
Rationality and common knowledge
Pinning down beliefs: Nash equilibrium
Mixed strategies
Part III: Dynamic games of complete information. Preliminaries
Credibility and sequential rationality
Multistage games
Repeated games
Strategic bargaining
Part IV: Static games of incomplete information. Bayesian games
Auctions and competitive bidding
Mechanism design
Part V: Dynamic games of incomplete information. Sequential rationality with incomplete information
Signaling games
Building a reputation
Information transmission and cheap talk
Mathematical appendix.
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ISBN
9780691129082 ((hbk. ; : alk. paper))
0691129088 ((hbk. ; : alk. paper))
LCCN
2012025166
OCLC
796355097
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